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Abstract: Is the extraction of private benefits by the firm’s controllers only an
issue for minority or non-controlling shareholders? Korea’s treatment of such
conduct (often called “tunneling”) provides useful insights to this question.
Tunneling by controlling shareholders, which has traditionally been the concern
of corporate governance law and policy in the U.S., is further subject to scrutiny
under competition law (Undue Support Clause) in Korea. This Article discusses
a real world example of an intersection between competition law and corporate
governance policy from a comparative perspective. The history of the Undue
Support Clause challenges the common perception that a corporate governance
malady has nothing to do with competition law (or vice versa). Although this is
not a complete survey of all the intricacies that can arise when competition and
corporate governance intersect with one another, Korea’s experience with the
Undue Support Clause provides an invaluable opportunity to reevaluate the
relationship between the two policies and draw valuable insights for other
jurisdictions, including the U.S., that tend to turn a blind eye towards harm
inflicted outside of the firm by tunneling.

†

Associate Professor, Seoul National University
Research Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Postdoctoral Fellow in
Corporate Law and Governance at Ira M. Millstein Center at Columbia Law School.
We are grateful to Holger Spamann, Paul Stephan, and participants at the Fourth Annual Younger
Comparativists Committee Conference for helpful comments.
*

267

36_2_1_LIMMIN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/16/2016 3:59 PM

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

36:267 (2016)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ........................................................................................... 269
II. The Undue Support Clause and Its Foray into Corporate
Governance .................................................................................... 272
A. Overview ................................................................................... 272
B. The Undue Support Clause as an Intersection of Corporate
Governance and Competition ................................................. 274
1. The Statute as a Part of the Corporate Governance Legal
System ............................................................................... 274
(a) The Rise of the Chaebols and Their Economic
Power .......................................................................... 274
(b) The Enactment and Subsequent Introduction of
Corporate Governance Considerations into the
Undue Support Clause ................................................ 276
2. The Statute as a Part of Competition Law.................................. 278
III. Competition and Corporate Governance: Complete Strangers,
Cordial Neighbors, or Possible Collaborators? .............................. 279
A. The Not-so-Informative Link of X-Inefficiency ........................ 279
B. Re-examining the Link in the Context of Tunneling ................. 281
1. Tunneling to Prevent Failing Affiliates from Exiting the
Market ............................................................................... 282
(a) The Court’s Condemnation of the Practice.................. 282
(b) The Faulty Rationale Behind the Condemnation ........ 284
(c) The Possible Harm to Competition from the Practice . 285
2. Tunneling by Funneling Business to an Affiliate ............... 287
(a) Funneling of Business as a Form of Tunneling ........... 287
(b) Proffered rationales for the practice’s harm to
competition ................................................................. 288
(c) An Interesting Twist to the Single Monopoly Profit
Theorem in the Case of Funneling.............................. 291
3. The Copperweld Objection ................................................. 293
IV. Learning from the Undue Support Clause: Implications for
Regulation of Tunneling ................................................................ 295
A. Implications for Antitrust Law .................................................. 296
B. Implications for Corporate Governance Law ............................ 297
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 301

268

36_2_1_LIMMIN

FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/16/2016 3:59 PM

Competition and Corporate Governance
36:267 (2016)

I. INTRODUCTION
Korean Air exclusively sources its in-flight magazine ad services and
online duty free sales through a company named Cybersky Co. Ltd
(Cybersky). Cybersky is a private company wholly owned by the three
children of the current Chairman and patriarch of Korean Air’s owner
family. Fresh out of the “nut rage” scandal, 1 the family is now facing
suspicion that it has privately benefited over the years from preferential
dealings between Cybersky and Korean Air and its other affiliates in the
conglomerate.2
Meanwhile, halfway around the world, Nordstrom Inc. is facing its
own set of allegations surrounding jets operated by the company. According
to a recently filed derivative suit, the company has been operating a large
fleet of private jets to the benefit of the Nordstrom family and,
concomitantly, a loss to other shareholders.3
While it remains to be seen whether the allegations are true, the
extraction of wealth from the firm by its controlling shareholders and
managers (controllers), or “tunneling” as it is commonly referred to, is a
well-known ailment in the corporate governance pathology. 4 The
conventional toolkit for preventing or treating its symptoms is comprised of
rules sprinkled throughout a diverse set of laws and regulations. As partly
showcased in the Nordstrom derivative suit above, these generally include
corporate law, securities and accounting regulations, stock exchange rules,
tax law, bankruptcy law, insolvency law and fraudulent conveyance law.5
Korea also has a statute that restricts tunneling activity by forbidding
improper wealth transfers from a firm to another party, making it
punishable not only by administrative surcharges, but also by criminal fines
and imprisonment. To be clear, this statute is not the sole anti-tunneling law
in Korea, and examples of criminal punishment of corporate governance
1

‘Nut rage’ incident could result in sanctions against Korean Air, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2014,
2:41 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/16/nut-rage-incident-sanctions-korean-air.
2
Sung-Hee Lee, Cho Hyun Ah deung Daehanhanggong 3 Nammaeeui ‘Saguiup’ Cybersky: Ilgam
Molajugi, Nodongryok Chakchi Nonlan [Cybersky, The Private Company of Hyun-Ah Cho and the
Three Korean Air Siblings. . . Allegations of Funneling of Business and Exploitation of Man Power],
KYUNGHYANG BIZNLIFE (Dec. 22, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://bizn.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=
201412220600385&code=920100&med=khan (S. Kor.).
3
Jonathan Randles, Nordstrom Hid Cost of Family’s Plane Rides, Shareholders Say, LAW360
(Mar. 13, 2015, 3:06 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/631017/nordstrom-hid-cost-of-family-splane-rides-shareholders-say.
4
There is no universal definition of “tunneling.” Related party transactions, even if they raise
potential conflicts of interest, are not always harmful to the corporation. Tunneling, as used in this
Article, describes the “transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefits of those who control
them” that negatively affect the firm’s value. Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AMER. ECON. REV.
22, 22 (2000).
5
Vladimir Atanasov et al., Law and Tunneling, 37 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 9–10 (2011).

269

36_2_1_LIMMIN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/16/2016 3:59 PM

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

36:267 (2016)

law violations can be easily found in other jurisdictions as well. What
makes this otherwise less remarkable statute rather peculiar is not so much
its content, but its placement. The statute is embedded in Chapter V of
Korea’s primary legislation on competition, i.e., the Monopoly Regulation
& Fair Trade Act (MRFTA). The authors are not aware of any other
jurisdiction around the world that similarly deploys competition law6 as part
of its corporate governance toolkit against tunneling activities.7
Enlisting competition law as a tool of corporate governance would
strike many as an odd choice, to say the least. At the heart of corporate
governance lies the agency problem, which percolates through the internal
workings of the firm. 8 By contrast, the concern of antitrust is market
competition, which involves the firm’s external interactions in the
marketplace. The two legal regimes, however, are not completely exclusive.
The firm acts within the boundaries of the market, and the market
environment informs the structure and behavior of the firm. Antitrust policy
could therefore have an impact on corporate governance to the extent that
market competition disciplines the firm’s agents.9 But this does not seem to
provide sufficient reason for competition policy to wade directly into
corporate governance issues. In fact, can a corporate governance problem
ever become a proper concern of competition policy? Even if that were the
case, could a law that focuses on the pathologies of the market provide an
effective cure for an internal ailment of the firm?
Korea’s unique application of competition law as a potential cure for
corporate governance problems serves as a policy experiment, providing a
rare opportunity to examine these and related questions based on real world
experience. 10 This Article is an attempt to explore whether and when
6

For purposes of discussion, competition (or antitrust) and corporate governance are posited as two
separate (but potentially interrelated) regimes or policies. When the Article refers to competition law or
corporate governance law, it points to the specific statutes, rules and regulations which uphold each
respective legal regime or policy.
7
See OECD, PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: GUIDANCE AND
GOOD PRACTICES 9–11 (2014), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/publicenforcement-and-corporate-governance-in-asia_9789264217409-en, which identifies major pillars that
uphold the corporate governance legal structure in different jurisdictions. The jurisdictions covered by
the report are Bangladesh, China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The jurisdictions utilize a mix of
corporate law, securities regulations, and corporate governance codes and guidelines. Only Korea,
however, includes competition law as a pillar of its corporate governance legal system.
8
See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
9
See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Are Efficient Antitrust Rules Always Optimal?, 48
ANTITRUST BULL. 807, 815–23 (2003) (discussing the possible effects antitrust policy may have on
corporate governance through the promotion of competition).
10
Korea’s unique application of competition law to issues traditionally viewed as those pertaining
to corporate governance has been noted in the past from several different perspectives. See, e.g., Haksoo
Ko, Dealing with Corporate Self-Dealing in Korea: A New Institutional Law and Economics Approach,
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competition law might play a constructive role in the area of corporate
governance by looking at Korea’s experience. A major point of divergence
in regulating tunneling between Korea and other jurisdictions, including the
U.S., is how to understand the harm caused by the conduct. For example,
should the law be primarily concerned with harm inflicted upon the
constituents of the firm (shareholders and possibly other stakeholders), or
should it also be concerned with the welfare of consumers in the market?
Because each jurisdiction must cope with the peculiarities of its own social
and market environment, the right answer may differ by jurisdiction.
However, this Article shows that, at least under certain circumstances,
tunneling can impact not only the welfare of those inside the firm
(shareholders), but also outside of it (consumers in the market), setting the
stage for a collaborative effort between competition law and corporate
governance. As Korea’s experience shows, such collaboration can be
beneficial, but will also face challenges such as identifying cognizable harm
to consumers as opposed to shareholders.
Part II of the Article will introduce the MRFTA’s statute and its
legislative history in order to lay down the groundwork for the analysis to
follow. In this process, we will also examine a threshold question—whether
the statute’s inclusion in the MRFTA is a genuine attempt to enlist
competition law as part of the corporate governance arsenal, and thus,
worthy of closer examination, or simply an idiosyncratic and thus,
coincidental choice of placement. In fact, the statute has drawn sharp
criticism in Korea from both competition law and corporate law experts,
who argue that there is no basis for competition law to interject itself into
corporate governance affairs. Accordingly, in Part III, we take a closer look
at the relationship between antitrust and corporate governance to examine
whether the choice to utilize competition law has any basis as a matter of
policy. Then, in Part IV, we will discuss what Korea’s experience teaches
us regarding both the advantages and limitations of competition law’s foray
into the corporate governance world. Finally, Part V concludes.

17 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 201, 213–18 (2009) (arguing from a transaction costs basis that Korea’s approach
of regulating corporate self-dealings with competition law is justified); Nansulhun Choi & Sang Yop
Kang, Competition Law Meets Corporate Governance: Ownership Structure, Voting Leverage, and
Investor Protection of Large Family Corporate Governance in Korea, 2 PKU TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 411,
411 (2014) (discussing the merits of a holding company system over circular shareholding in terms of
mitigating agency costs in the case of large Korean conglomerates) (China). This Article is distinct from
the existing literature in the sense that it focuses directly on both the theoretical and practical
underpinnings of utilizing competition law as a corporate governance policy tool and extending the
findings to other jurisdictions such as the United States
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II. THE UNDUE SUPPORT CLAUSE AND ITS FORAY INTO
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Overview
Chapter V of the MRFTA, Korea’s primary competition law, consists
of five articles. The statute of concern for purposes of our discussion is
Article 23.11 Article 23, which is said to have its roots in Section 5 of the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act, deals with “unfair trade practices.”12
Paragraph (1) of Article 23 lists seven specific types of unfair trade
practices, followed by a catch-all provision. The seventh prohibited practice
is called “undue support.” 13 The current language of the statute is as
follows:
Article 23. Prohibition of Unfair Trade Practices
(1) An undertaking shall not itself, or have an affiliated company or
another undertaking, engage in any practices that fall under the
following subparagraphs and raise the concern of harming fair trade
(hereinafter, referred to as “unfair trade practices”).
...
(vii) Unduly supporting a Specially Related Party 14 or another
11
Article 23-3 prohibits retaliatory actions against parties who have complained to the Korea Fair
Trade Commission (KFTC) or are cooperating with it regarding investigations into such practices.
Dokjeom-Gyuje Mit Gongjeong-Georae-e Gwanhan Beobryul [Monopoly Regulation & Fair Trade
Act], Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, as amended by Act No. 11937, July 16, 2013 (S. Kor.).
Articles 24 and 24-2 provide for corrective measures and administrative surcharges against violations of
the Chapter’s articles. Id.
12
Jung Ha Lim, Budang-Jeewon-Hangwee Gyoojae-e Gwanhan Noneui – Budang-JeewonHangwee-eui Sungreep-Yokun-eul Joongshim-euro [Review of Restrictions on Undue Support Practices
– Focusing on Legal Requirements for Undue Support Practices], 10 ECON. L. no. 2, 2008, at 45, 47
(2012). Article 23 of the MRFTA was modeled after the Unfair Trade Practices provisions of the
Japanese Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Shiteki-dokusen
no Kinshi oyobi Kōseitorihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Hōritsu, Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 19, which in
turn was based on Section 5 of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C §§ 41–58
(2015). ETSUKO KEMEOKA, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND THE EU 58 (2014). To be
sure, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition.” 15
U.S.C. § 45.
13
The KFTC has often referred to the prohibited type of practice as “undue internal transactions.”
But see Bong-Eui Lee, Dokjeom-Gyuje Beobsang Budang-Jeewon-Hangwee – Beobgwa Jungchek-ui
Johwa Shido [A Study on Unfair Supporting Practices – An Attempt to Harmonize Law and Policy], 27
J, KOREAN COMPETITION L. 228, 229 n.4 (2013) (noting that undue internal transactions and undue
supporting activities are different concepts under the MRFTA and should be clearly distinguished from
one another) (S. Kor.).
14
The MRFTA and its underlying rules provide detailed definitions of Specially Related Parties.
Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, as amended by Act No. 11937, July 16, 2013, art. 7(1) (S. Kor.);
Dokjeom-Gyuje Mit Gongjeong-Georae-e Gwanhan Beobryul Shihaengryung [Enforcement Decree of
the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act], Presidential Decree No. 25840, Dec. 9, 2014, arts. 3(a),
11 (S. Kor.). For purposes of this Article, Specially Related Parties of an undertaking can be broadly
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company through either of the following acts:
(a) providing advanced payments, loans, manpower, real
estate, commercial notes, goods, services, intangible
property, etc., to a Specially Related Party or another
company, or transacting on considerably advantageous terms
therefor;
(b) transacting with another undertaking through a Specially
Related Party or another company that does not have a
substantial role in the transaction, despite it being
considerably advantageous to directly transact with such
undertaking.

Article 23(1)(vii)(a) prohibits a firm from harming fair trade by
providing support to another party (either a person or company, affiliated or
non-affiliated) via transfer of various resources or transacting such
resources on terms that are considerably favorable to the other party.15 On
its face, the scope of the statute is not limited to tunneling activities, since
its reach extends to wealth transfers not only to the controllers of the firm or
affiliates but to non-affiliated third parties as well.16 However, the statute
has primarily been enforced against tunneling occurring at Korea’s large
family-controlled conglomerates, or chaebols.17
Article 23(1)(vii)(b) prohibits a specific type of tunneling called
“tolling,” where a party (usually one affiliated with the controllers) is
inserted into the chain of transaction without a proper business reason,
resulting in its extraction of part of the value generated by the transaction.18
understood as a party (whether a person or a company) that has effective control over the undertaking
(through shareholding or other means of control) or those with certain familial relationships with such
party (in the case of a person).
15
Before a 2013 amendment of the MRFTA, the statute required that the terms be “significantly”
advantageous to the supported party. The amendment lowered the threshold to “considerably” with the
intent of expanding the statute to capture less-than-significant but nevertheless favorable dealings and
lower the burden of proof for the KFTC in prosecuting Article 23(1)(vii). See generally Yunjeong Kim,
Teuksoo-Gwangyein-e Daehan Budang-Eeik-Jaegong-Hangwee Gyuje-eui Beobjuk Jengjumkwa
Gaesun-Gwajae [Issues and Improvements for Regulation of Undue Provision of Benefits to Specially
Related Persons], 29 J. KOREAN COMPETITION L. 80 (2014) (providing a more detailed explanation on
the history and background of the 2013 amendment) (S. Kor.).
16
Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, as amended by Act No. 11937, July 16, 2013 (S. Kor.). On its face,
the statutory language condemns virtually any wealth transfer (whether cash, assets or equity) to another
party on terms that considerably deviates from an arms-length transaction, regardless of the relationship
between the parties.
17
KFTC, GONGJEONG GEORAE UIWONHUI-EUI 30NYEONSA [A HISTORY OF THREE DECADES AT
THE FAIR TRADE COMMISSION] 449 (2011) [hereinafter KFTC, A HISTORY] (S. Kor.). Chaebols refer to
powerful Korean conglomerates dominated or controlled by a Chairman and his or her family, most of
whom have played a significant role in the development and rise of the Korean economy. Examples of
easily recognizable chaebol names include Samsung, LG, and Hyundai Motors.
18
An example may help the reader. Companies X and Y wish to transact with one another. Instead
of directly transacting with Y, X inserts Z into the chain of transaction despite the fact that Z will not be
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Article 23(2) makes the supported party liable for a violation of Article
23(1)(vii) in addition to the supporting party.19 Both Articles 23(1)(vii)(b)
and 23(2) were added to Article 23 through an amendment of the MRFTA
in 2013. The amendment also added Article 23-2, which prohibits the
provision of certain improper benefits to specially related parties.20
Due to their recent introduction into the MRFTA, no enforcement
cases have yet been brought under Articles 23(1)(vii)(b) and 23-2.
Accordingly, this Article will primarily focus on Article 23(1)(vii)(a), the
“Undue Support Clause.”
B. The Undue Support Clause as an Intersection of Corporate
Governance and Competition
Before we dissect the Undue Support Clause to examine whether
competition law can play a constructive role in the corporate governance
legal system, we must first confirm that the statute truly represents a
genuine intersection between corporate governance and competition.21
1. The Statute as a Part of the Corporate Governance Legal System
(a) The Rise of the Chaebols and Their Economic Power
The chaebols were instrumental in implementing industrial policy
during Korea’s post-war development, particularly from the 1960s
onward. 22 In this capacity, the chaebols were also the beneficiaries of
providing any meaningful incremental value to the transaction. Z is a company owned by X’s
controllers, and will be taking a cut of the margin while serving as a pass-through (toll booth) for the
transaction, leading to the extraction of wealth from X or Y to Z (and eventually to Z’s controllers).
According to the taxonomy provided by Atanasov, tolling would mainly occur in the form of cash flow
tunneling. Atanasov et. al., supra note 5, at 5–6, Again, as in the case of Article 23(1)(vii)(a), the
language does not limit the scope of the statute to tunneling, and broadly condemns the existence of a
party in the transaction chain that does not have a reasonable justification for being included in the chain
or does not provide value commensurate to the compensation it receives for its services.
19
The provision’s language is as follows: “Neither a Specially Related Party or another company
shall receive support from another undertaking when there is a concern that such support shall violate
Paragraph (1)(vii) above.” Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, as amended by Act No. 11937, July 16, 2013
(S. Kor.).
20
Article 23-2 was enacted based on criticism that Article 23(1)(vii) was ineffective in preventing
certain equity tunneling to members of the chaebol’s owner-family and “funneling of business” type
transactions. Kim, supra note 15, at 81–86.
21
This question is worth asking because the decision to place a statute in a particular type of law
may not necessarily be based on the statute’s relevancy to the law’s purpose or intent. See Atanasov et
al., supra note 5, at 9–10 (noting the need to formulate a taxonomy of tunneling related rules that do not
depend on idiosyncratic decisions of where to place a particular rule).
22
See Michael A. Witt, South Korea: Plutocratic State-Led Capitalism Reconfiguring, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 2 (Michael A. Witt & Gordon Redding eds., 2014)
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government aid and preferential regulatory treatment which allowed, and in
some cases actively facilitated, the acquisition of significant market power
in segments where they were active.23 By 1980, the share of the top thirty
chaebols amounted to 36% of the national economy as measured by their
share of turnover in the manufacturing and mining sector. 24 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, a significant portion of the nation’s economy at the time
operated in markets controlled by monopolies or oligopolies.25 In 1986, a
host of regulations aimed at curbing economic concentration were
introduced into Chapter III of the MRFTA because the concentration of
economic power into the hands of the chaebols was perceived as a threat to
the sustainable and balanced development of the nation’s market
economy. 26 These included targeted restrictions against the chaebols
regarding the establishment of holding companies, direct crossshareholdings, ceilings on the total possible amount of investment, and the
exercise of voting rights by affiliates in the financial and insurance
industries.27
Despite these attempts to stem the tide of economic concentration into
the hands of the chaebols, the growth of their economic power and
influence continued unabated throughout the following decade. By 1995,
the top five chaebols accounted for more than 25% of the nation’s
economic activity, while the top thirty chaebols’ share of activity increased
to 40.7%.28 During this period, the chaebols also expanded their reach into

(distinguishing the Korean development model with the Japanese model based on its reliance on the
chaebols, and describing the business as a “subservient tool” for the governments’ economic policy);
KFTC, A HISTORY, supra note 17, at 160.
23
Jin-Young Jung, Post-Crisis Restructuring of the Corporate Governance of Korean Companies,
13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 3, 5–6 (2013).
24
KFTC, A HISTORY, supra note 17, at 245.
25
See Meong-Cho Yang, Competition Law and Policy of the Republic of Korea, 54 ANTITRUST
BULL. 621, 622 (2009) (citing statistics by the Economic Planning Board (EPB), which show that
monopolies or oligopolies manufactured 89% of industrial goods produced in the country in 1979). Prior
to an amendment of the MRFTA in 1990, the KFTC served as an advisory body for the minister of the
EPB.
26
KFTC, A HISTORY, supra note 17, at 160–61; Seung-Wha Chang & Youngjin Jung, Korea’s
Competition Law and Policies in Perspective, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 687, 692–93 (2006).
27
These restrictions were introduced in Chapter III of the MRFTA in 1986 under the added title of
“Control of Economic Concentration.” Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, as amended by Act No. 3875, Dec.
31, 1986 (S. Kor.). Article 1 of the MRFTA had already mentioned the “prevention of excessive
economic concentration” as one of the law’s primary enforcement objectives. However, it was only from
the 1986 amendment that the MRFTA incorporated specific rules targeting economic concentration.
KFTC, A HISTORY, supra note 17, at 122. The Korean Constitution was also amended in 1987 to
explicitly provide the government with the authority to pursue policies that restrain economic
concentration and dispense with any constitutional doubts about laws that purported to do so.
DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 119 (S. Kor.).
28
KFTC, A HISTORY, supra note 17, at 245. The figures are measured by the chaebol’s share of
turnover in the manufacturing and mining sector.
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various markets through the acquisition or establishment of affiliated
companies. In 1987, the total number of companies affiliated with the top
thirty chaebols was 493. A decade later, that number had increased to 819.29
The concentration of economic power was further reflected in the chaebols’
market power. As of 1997, one could find at least one of the top thirty
chaebols among the top three competitors in 83.4% of the product markets
where they were active.30 They were the number one market leader in 41%
of such markets.31
(b) The Enactment and Subsequent Introduction of Corporate
Governance Considerations into the Undue Support Clause
The Undue Support Clause was introduced into the MRFTA against
this backdrop. 32 At the time of the statute’s enactment, inter-group
(affiliated) dealings among the large chaebols constituted nearly 25% of
their total turnover.33 There were concerns that the significant volume of
affiliated transactions supported the expansion and consolidation of the
chaebol’s economic power. Such affiliated transactions were perceived as
often being carried out to maximize the socio-economic prestige and
influence wielded by the chaebol family rather than to maximize
shareholder value and efficiency.34
Thus the stated primary legislative goal of the Undue Support Clause
was to control economic concentration.35 While the perceived problems of
affiliated dealings likely reflected a breakdown in corporate governance,
such concerns—like harm to creditors and minority shareholders—were not
explicitly mentioned or discussed in the legislative documents.36
29

Id. at 246. The top thirty chaebols on average were active in 19.7 different businesses.
Id.
31
Id.
32
The MRFTA was amended on Dec. 30, 1996, and the amendments including the Undue Support
Clause came into effect as of Apr. 1, 1997. Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, as amended by Act No. 5235,
Dec. 30, 1996 (S. Kor.).
33
Byung-Duk Chung, Gongjeong-Georae Beobsang-eui Gieob Jibdan Gyuje-eui Hyeonhwang-gwa
Gwaje [The State and Challenges of the Regulation of Business Conglomerates under the Fair Trade
Act], 36 DANKOOK L. REV. 777, 788 (2012) (S. Kor.); KFTC, 9908Joeui1245 (Decision No. 99-213),
Oct. 28, 1999 (S. Kor.).
34
KFTC, A HISTORY, supra note 17, at 261.
35
Kim, supra note 15, at 82 (referring to a 1996 report by the Public Administration Committee of
the National Assembly). The report also included assisting the shift from a monopolistic or oligopolistic
market structure to a more competitive one, strengthening the national economy’s overall
competitiveness as a purpose of the amendment.
36
Jeong Seo, Budang-Jeewon-Hangwee Gyuje-ae Gwanhan Yeongu [A Study on the Regulation of
Undue Support] 15 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University) (S. Kor.). Rather,
at the time of the statute’s enactment, the primary concern with undue supporting seems to have been its
role in the prevention or delay of the exit of an inefficient or failing affiliate, and its utilization as a tool
to degrade or foreclose rivals of the supported affiliate from the market. Lim, supra note 12, at 49; Lee,
30
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However, due to the nature of the targeted activities, the regulation of
undue support had ramifications for corporate governance. This was
particularly evident in the cases where undue support seemed more oriented
towards expanding the size and scope of the chaebol (thus boosting the
prestige of its owner-family controllers) rather than the interests of
shareholders. That left the door open for possible future injections of
corporate governance considerations into the statute, which is precisely
what happened in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997.37 The 1997
crisis exposed a slew of problems with the management and corporate
governance of chaebols. In response, the authorities increasingly began to
view the Undue Support Clause as a part of the corporate governance
toolkit. The KFTC’s regulation of undue support among chaebol affiliates
became an integral part of the Korean government’s post-crisis corporate
restructuring and reform program.38 This shift in the underlying perception
of the role and purpose of the Undue Support Clause culminated in a 2003
Korean Constitutional Court decision stating that one of the statute’s goals
was to prevent activity that “degraded corporate transparency and harmed
the interests of shareholders (particularly minority shareholders) and
creditors.”39
While the court’s statement has been the subject of much criticism,40 it
at least seems clear that the Undue Support Clause was enacted to intervene
into the affairs of the chaebols, which includes their corporate
governance.41 As we shall later see, deciding the proper extent and scope of

supra note 13, at 229.
37
Seo, supra note 36, at 11.
38
KFTC, A HISTORY, supra note 17, at 426–30. When the maximum administrative surcharge
amount for a violation of the Undue Support Clause was increased from 2% to 5% of the supporting
company’s relevant revenue in late 1999, one of the main reasons cited for the increase was the
facilitation of the chaebols’ corporate restructuring. Jin Yul Ju, Gongjeong-Georae Beobsang Budang
Jeewon Hangwee Gyuje-ae Daehan Bipanjuk Gochal [A Critical Analysis of the Regulation of Undue
Support under the Fair Trade Act], 53 SEOUL L.J. 637, 641 (2012) (referring to a 1999 report by the
National Policy Committee of the National Assembly) (S. Kor.).
39
Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2001Hun-Ka25, Jul. 24, 2003, (15-2(A) KCCR 1) (S. Kor.).
The court mentioned three other harms stemming from undue supporting: (i) degrading the proper
functioning of the market by unduly foreclosing independent (non-affiliated) competitors or deterring
new market entry by allowing the survival or preventing the exit of failing and inefficient affiliated
companies, (ii) causing economic concentration by increasing the monopoly power of affiliated
companies within large conglomerates through the mutual generation of monopolistic or oligopolistic
rents, and (iii) leading to systemic risks for the entire conglomerate and its member companies as a
result of the dispersion or draining of the core competencies of the conglomerate’s healthy companies
toward failing affiliates. Id.
40
See, e.g., Jeong Seo, Budang Jeewon Hangwee Gyuje, Manneung Chiyoochaeg-inga? Mokjeoggwa Sudan-eui Jeonghabseong-e Gwanhan Geomto [Is the Regulation of Undue Support a Panacea? –
A Review of the Consistency between its Objectives and Methods], 3 YONSEI GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 31,
39–41 (2011) (S. Kor.).
41
See also Chang & Jung, supra note 26, at 694 (stating that the Korean authorities consider
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such intervention has been one of the core issues in the enforcement of the
statute.
2. The Statute as a Part of Competition Law
While we have established the Undue Support Clause’s relevance to
corporate governance, we must still confirm that the statute constitutes a
part of competition law.42
The fact that the statute is located in competition law does not make
the answer a foregone conclusion. As discussed above, the statute was
enacted with the primary objective of controlling economic concentration.
While economic concentration and the resulting market structure certainly
have an impact on competition, the control of economic concentration
seems more apt as a subject of industrial or economic policy rather than a
goal of antitrust.43 Other rules in Chapter III44 of the MRFTA that purport to
combat economic concentration, which include restrictions on crossshareholdings, investments, voting rights, holding companies, and
disclosure obligations for self-dealing type transactions, are often found in
and could readily be placed in other types of law (e.g., corporate law and
securities regulations). 45 This may prompt some to question whether the
MRFTA’s inclusion of the Undue Support Clause might have been the
result of an idiosyncratic choice of placement, rather than a recognition of
the statute’s relevance to competition policy.
In fact, the legislative proposal for the Undue Support Clause had
originally placed the statute in Chapter III in line with its stated purpose to
regulate economic concentration. However, following strong objections
from the chaebols who did not wish to see another rule added to Chapter
corporate governance issues and economic concentration to be closely related).
42
The policy goals of the MRFTA may include objectives that exceed the scope of U.S. antitrust
law. The MRFTA’s objectives encompass considerations of fairness, protection of small-and-mediumsized enterprises, and even industrial policy. OH-SEUNG KWON, GYUNGJAEBEOB [ECONOMIC LAW] 79–
86 (11th ed. 2014) (S. Kor.). The question here, however, is not whether the MRFTA might include the
improvement of corporate governance as an objective, but whether the Undue Support Clause’s purpose
is to protect competition as commonly understood as the proper objective of competition law.
43
See Seo, supra note 40, at 43–44. The legislative goals of the Sherman Act has also been the
subject of debate in the past, and commentators have pointed to the fear against “bigness” as one of the
ideological driving forces behind the enactment of the law. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, 57–61 (4th ed. 2011). Modern
antirust policy in the U.S., however, has moved on from concerns of bigness to the protection of
consumer welfare enhancing competition.
44
The title of Chapter III of the MRFTA is “Restriction of Business Combinations and the Control
of Economic Concentration.”
45
The KFTC itself acknowledged as early as 2003 that MRFTA provisions which directly
regulated economic concentration could cede their role to corporate and other laws once corporate
governance improved and market discipline became effective. KFTC, A HISTORY, supra note 17, at 432;
Chang & Jung, supra note 26, at 694.
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III, the statute was eventually incorporated into Article 23 in Chapter V.46
The placement of the statute under Article 23 and its categorization as a
type of unfair trade practice required that the undue support cause “harm to
fair trade,” which according to the courts is ultimately caused by restricting
competition in the relevant market of the support’s recipient.47 The courts
have also refused to find a violation in cases where there is simply no nexus
to market competition even on a conceptual level. 48 The Undue Support
Clause’s placement in Chapter V of the MRFTA, and the courts’
subsequent interpretation of the statute, at least conceptually, as one
regulating anticompetitive conduct, confirms the statute as a part of
competition law.
* * *
In sum, we have met the threshold of identifying a genuine case of an
intersection between competition law and corporate governance law in the
Undue Support Clause. Now we must examine whether competition policy
has anything to do with corporate governance policy in the first place. If the
answer is no, we have a schizophrenic statute at odds with itself. If the
answer is yes, the question then becomes what are the common grounds
between the two policies.
III. COMPETITION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
COMPLETE STRANGERS, CORDIAL NEIGHBORS, OR POSSIBLE
COLLABORATORS?
A. The Not-so-Informative Link of X-Inefficiency
Competition policy’s effect on corporate governance, and vice versa, is
a topic that has not garnered much attention.49 One reason for this may be
the fact that modern antitrust policy has narrowed its focus on consumer
welfare effects while trying to avoid getting entangled in other social and
46
Ho Young Lee, Gyeongjeryuk-jibjoong Eokje-leul Weehan Gyeongjaengbeobjeog Gyuje-eui
Yooyongseong-gwa Hangye [The Usefulness and Limitations of Competition Law’s Regulation of
Economic Concentration], 24 HANYANG L. REV. 153, 157 & n.9 (2007) (S. Kor.).
47
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Du6364, Sept. 24, 2004 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2001Du7220, Mar. 12, 2004 (S. Kor.).
48
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2004Du2219, Jan. 27, 2005 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2001Du6364, Sep. 24, 2004 (S. Kor.).
49
Farber & McDonnell, supra note 9, at 815 (noting the competition policy’s effect on corporate
governance issues is a topic that has “received less attention than it deserves”). Other examples of recent
rare forays into the relationship of antitrust policy and corporate governance include a comparative study
on competition policy’s implications for state-owned enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy
and Comparative Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713 (2009),
and corporate governance law’s possible role in strengthening antitrust compliance, Jesse W. Markham,
Jr., The Failure of Corporate Governance Standards and Antitrust Compliance, 58 S.D. L. REV. 499
(2013).
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policy objectives. 50 Another reason for this from antitrust jurisprudence
may be the intraenterprise conspiracy or single economic entity theory. In
the U.S., this theory has been espoused in Copperweld51 and its progeny,
which exclude most agreements between affiliates or enterprises under
common control from antitrust scrutiny under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.52
That being said, competition’s potential for reducing managerial slack
on the part of the corporation’s agents has not gone unnoticed. It is well
recognized that product market competition can function as another
disciplinary mechanism against incompetent managers, and competition can
also supplement other corporate governance mechanisms by better exposing
inefficient managers at the corporation when they are surpassed by more
efficient rivals.53 The relationship between product market competition and
corporate governance has been discussed under the topic of X-inefficiency,
the “slack in the system due to [firms] not minimizing costs or being on
their production possibility frontier,” 54 which shows that a monopolist,
under less competitive pressure, is likely to suffer more from agency
problems (managerial slack) than a competitive firm.55
Competition policy then would not seem to be a complete stranger to
corporate governance policy. However, while the above discussion
identifies a link between the two policies, it does not provide specific
guidance on how competition law could play a constructive role in
corporate governance. It only suggests that competition policy should do its
job of protecting competition, since healthier competition could possibly
lead to better corporate governance. This is equivalent to saying that the
two policies should act as cordial neighbors, simply minding their own

50
Kenneth Heyer, Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork, 57 J.L. & ECON. S19, S20
(2014).
51
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
52
U.S. courts have held that such enterprises are generally incapable of conspiring with one another
for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but there is some disagreement as to the thresholds for
ownership or control that preclude antitrust scrutiny. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 32–33 (7th ed. 2012). Similarly, in the EU, arrangements between undertakings
that act as a single economic unit in the market are outside the purview of Article 101(1) of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union. ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW
135–37 (4th ed. 2011).
53
Farber & McDonnell, supra note 9, at 816–18.
54
Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 BELL J. ECON. 366, 366
(1983).
55
Id.; Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1472–73
(2001); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 300 (2003);
Farber & McDonnell, supra note 9, at 817. Cf. RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 18 (2d ed. 2001)
(noting the possibility that competition may in fact reduce incentives to reduce costs, and arguing that
whether or not a monopoly spurs management to innovate is an empirical question that has not yet been
conclusively answered).
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affairs and believing that all will be well if they do so.56
Another limitation to the above discussion is product market
competition’s differing potential in disciplining different types of agency
problems. Managerial slack poses an agency problem where the manager
(agent) fails to act in the best interests of the shareholders (principal). But
managerial slack may be less of a concern when the corporation is
effectively owned by a controlling shareholder, since the owner-controlling
shareholder would be able to readily discipline an inefficient manager and
have the incentives to do so. 57 In fact, when the owner-controlling
shareholder also serves as the manager of the corporation, this agency
problem would in theory disappear since the manager would act in his or
her own best interest as the owner of the corporation.
However, such corporations are subject to another agency problem.
The owner-controlling shareholder (and possibly manager) may act to the
detriment of minority shareholders or other stakeholders of the corporation.
And while robust product market competition can exert general pressure on
the firm’s managers to keep the firm efficiently managed, it is likely to be
less effective in preventing the extraction of wealth from the corporation to
its owner-controlling shareholders, i.e. tunneling.58 As long as the wealth
extraction does not materially impair the competitiveness of the tunneling
firm and lead to its exit from the market, the owner-controlling
shareholder’s gains from tunneling may well exceed the loss of wealth from
a decrease in the value of the tunneling firm. Product market competition
therefore seems less likely to provide an effective check against such
activities. The discussion on X-inefficiency is not unhelpful, but comes up
rather short in properly illuminating the relationship between corporate
governance and competition.
B. Re-examining the Link in the Context of Tunneling
To better grasp the relationship between corporate governance and
competition policy, we will re-examine the link between the two policies in
56
The X-inefficiency theory also fails to meaningfully inform us about the other side of the
equation—the effect corporate governance rules could have on competition. To the extent that better
corporate governance leads to better legal compliance with antitrust rules, corporate governance might
have an indirect but positive effect on competition. Markham, supra note 49, at 500. But we are still at a
loss as to how corporate governance rules can specifically impact market competition.
57
Roe, supra note 55, at 1472. This is the case for the Korean chaebols.
58
See Farber & McDonnell, supra note 9, at 820 n. 37 (noting that product market competition
does not seem to be effective in resolving corporate governance issues related to self-dealing).
Reputational effects or competitive pressure from the labor market for managerial talent will also be
ineffective in this case, because the owner-managers are likely not interested in participating in the
market for managers and it is difficult for the minority shareholders to replace such owner-managers.
This is the case for the chaebols, who are under the ownership and management of their respective
families. Ko, supra note 10, at 209.
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the context of tunneling, which is the focus of this Article. Since the
ultimate goal is to derive lessons from Korea’s experience enforcing the
Undue Support Clause, we choose two specific types of tunneling activity
that at different times have been the subject of scrutiny under the Undue
Support Clause.59
1. Tunneling to Prevent Failing Affiliates from Exiting the Market
(a) The Court’s Condemnation of the Practice
First, consider “propping,” the most extreme form of tunneling. In a
propping transaction, a company transacts with (cash flow tunneling) or
invests in (asset or equity tunneling) a failing affiliate with the purpose of
preventing the affiliate’s exit from the market. The possibility of harming
minority shareholders or creditors of the company becomes starker when (i)
the receiving affiliate is privately held by the owner-controlling shareholder
of the firm and (ii) the conglomerate is of concentric form60 with the two
firms operating in unrelated product markets.61
Many of the chaebols experienced financial difficulties in the
aftermath of the 1997 crisis and engaged in propping to save individual
companies within the conglomerate from exiting the market.62 This practice
has been almost universally condemned by the courts.63 While the possible
59
Yong Lim, Recounting the History of the Undue Support Clause’s Enforcement: Lessons for
Competition Law & Policy, 44 BUBHAKYEONGU (JUNBOOK UNIV.) 291, 294–95 (2015) (S. Kor.). The
authors note that this will lead to limitations for the analysis regarding corporate governance problems
outside the context of tunneling, or even for types of tunneling other than the two examples discussed in
the following. That being said, the two examples that will be discussed provides a valuable opportunity
to think about the relationship between the two policies that has direct relevancy for real world
enforcement.
60
See J. Fred Weston, The Nature and Significance of Conglomerate Firms, 44 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
66, 66–68 (1970) (categorizing different types of conglomerate firms).
61
This would make it more difficult to justify the propping on the grounds that it would directly
benefit the products or business of the supporting firm (e.g., stable supply of critical or hard-to-procure
inputs). In fact, the Supreme Court has held that even if an affiliate provides key raw materials for a
firm’s flagship product, that alone does not justify the firm in providing economic support to alleviate
the affiliate’s interim cash flow problem. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Du2935, Oct. 14, 2004 (S. Kor.).
Another possible reason for the propping, which is unrelated to wealth extraction, is to ensure the
survival of the tunneling firm (rather than only the affiliate) by preventing the spread of credit risk
within the conglomerate. This collective credit risk problem, however, has actually been used more as a
reason to rigorously enforce the Undue Support Clause rather than as a justification for such propping.
The Undue Support Clause is said to have been enacted to preempt the very possibility of such risks
occurring by preventing excessive reliance on intragroup transactions and credit support among the
member companies of a chaebol. KFTC, A HISTORY, supra note 17, at 262.
62
This kind of propping was sometimes even extended to companies that were not member firms of
the conglomerate, but were owned or controlled by extended relatives of the owner-family. See, e.g.,
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Du7220, Mar. 12, 2004 (S. Kor.).
63
See, e.g., id.; Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Du2304, Oct. 12, 2004 (S. Kor.). But see Seo, supra
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corporate governance problems stemming from the practice are not difficult
to understand, some have raised questions as to whether the court’s
condemnation had any basis from a competition policy perspective.64
The courts’ explanations on why the practice would harm competition
is conclusory and unilluminating. Courts have either stated that preventing
the failing affiliate from exiting the market constitutes a harm to
competition without providing any further explanation, 65 or they have
opined that the affiliate’s survival may drive existing rivals from the market
and discourage new market entry.66
Some have attempted to explicate the court’s rationale by arguing that
the supported affiliate would artificially gain competitive advantages devoid
of any basis on its competitive merits, which would allow the revitalized
affiliate to exclude rivals from the market. 67 It has also been argued that
prospective competitors would be discouraged from entering the market for
fear that they would have to contend with the financial and business heft of
the entire chaebol group, thereby reducing the contestability of the market
and solidifying the market power of the chaebol group and its member
companies.68 Still others have argued that the cross-subsidization among the
chaebol’s member companies would enable the supported affiliate to
engage in predatory pricing or tying and thus foreclose current and
prospective competitors from the market. 69 These arguments are
reminiscent of past theories concerning the anticompetitive effects of
conglomerate mergers, often referred to as “entrenchment.”70
note 40, at 38 (criticizing the court’s condemnation as applying a double standard to such practices on
the basis that the government itself engaged in such emergency actions during the 1997 crisis).
64
See Ju, supra note 38, at 653–54.
65
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2004Du3281, Apr. 29, 2005; Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Du6197, Apr.
9, 2004 (S. Kor.). The courts have often described this as “maintenance of the affiliate’s position in the
market,” while not elaborating on how specifically that would harm competition.
66
The KFTC has also condemned such practices without elaborating on why and how specifically
the prevention of market exit would be anticompetitive or improper, i.e., “undue.” See, e.g., KFTC,
2001Jogi2455 (Decision No. 2001-178), Dec. 18, 2001 (S. Kor.); see also Lim, supra note 12, at 62
(criticizing the KFTC for its failure to actually assess anticompetitive effects of alleged acts of undue
support).
67
Lee, supra note 46, at 156.
68
Id.
69
Lim, supra note 12, at 61.
70
See, e.g., id. (basing such concerns on “entrenchment” effects). Some have compared the
rationale underlying the KFTC and the court’s position with “portfolio effects” theory. Seo, supra note
36, at 102–10. Portfolio effects are said to arise when a merger results in the consolidation of an array of
complementary goods or services, possibly resulting in transaction cost savings for customers that
purchase such complementary products from the merged firm. As is evident from the description,
portfolio effects may actually benefit customers, and thus are no longer summarily condemned under
conventional antitrust analysis. One may posit the possibility that the portfolio may facilitate
anticompetitive conduct such as tying or predatory pricing, but condemnation now requires further
require evidence that such conduct has or is highly likely to occur (post-merger). This is true even in the
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(b) The Faulty Rationale Behind the Condemnation
The fundamental weakness of the entrenchment theory is its distorted
view of competitive advantages provided through economies of scale and
scope, essentially rendering the theory into an aversion against “bigness”
itself without discerning whether the advantages are a result of efficiency.71
If a rival of the affiliate was eventually excluded from the market due
to some competitive advantage of the affiliate like lower prices or better
quality, allowing this to happen would benefit consumers, not harm them. If
instead the affiliate were just able to survive in its current inefficient form
with the help of the tunneling company, it seems more likely than not that it
would pose little threat to its more efficient rivals, who have already been
able to surpass the affiliate with or without support from a larger
conglomerate group.
One could theoretically worry about predation, but that would require
further proof of the existence of market entry barriers or lack of future entry
following the exclusion of the rival that would render the predation
unprofitable. The fact that the affiliate is already losing out to rivals and is
on the verge of exiting the market would likely mean that it already has
higher costs than its more efficient rivals, again making a predation strategy
harder to implement.
As for the chaebol’s “deep pockets” reducing the contestability of the
market, the fact that the affiliate is failing casts doubts on such a
proposition, and if the argument is to take issue with market entry being
deterred by competitive advantages conferred by size (economies of scope
and scale), that is nothing more than a frontal assault on competition itself.72
Moreover, efficient rivals who have managed to push the affiliate to the
brink of market exit would presumably be able to attract investment and
funding if necessary and would attempt to achieve similar economies of
scale. The proffered rationale for condemning the practice of saving failing
affiliates seems unsatisfactory from a competition policy perspective.73
EU, which has shown more willingness than the United States to prosecute based on concerns about
portfolio effects. Jones & Sufrin, supra note 52, at 962–63. Undue supporting activities have not been
limited to transactions between affiliates which produce complementary products. Funneling of
business, however, could involve affiliates which provide complementary or supporting services, giving
rise to tying or leveraging type anticompetitive theories. See Part III.B.2 infra.
71
Richard Posner, Conglomerate Mergers and Antitrust Policy: An Introduction, 44 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 529, 531 (1970); Cristofer Esty Lord, Entrenchment Challenges to Conglomerate Mergers, 60
WASH. U. L. REV. 537, 575 (1982).
72
Lord, supra note 71, at 573.
73
This is not to say that “bigness” is harmless. Bigness may result in an increased propensity to
seek preferential but socially inefficient treatment from the government because a conglomerate can also
benefit from economies of scale and scope in such activities as well. ADI AYAL, FAIRNESS IN
ANTITRUST: PROTECTING THE STRONG FROM THE WEAK 69–70 (2014) (arguing that the conglomerate
form could in theory both increase or reduce the incentives to influence governmental action); Kenneth
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In fact, critics have gone so far as to argue that the practice would
actually facilitate competition.74 This argument is based on the theory that
one additional competitor is better than the status quo. That may or may not
be true. Ensuring the survival of the affiliate and allowing it to live to fight
another day could result in reinvigorated competition if the affiliate were to
increase its efficiency to match or exceed rivals following the injection of
support. It seems hard to argue that this is likely when the affiliate is
already failing. It also seems unlikely that the affiliate would be able to
exert any meaningful competitive pressure on its rivals for the time because
it is presumably less efficient and has higher costs than its more successful
competitors.
One could also conceive of an argument that conglomerates facilitate
competition in general as it makes market entry less risky and easier to the
extent that the newly entering affiliate can leverage synergies created by the
conglomerate form.75 While this again is theoretically possible, it would not
seem applicable to the current case where the chaebol has already entered
the market and the prospects of the affiliate reinvigorating competition in
the foreseeable future seems low at best.76
(c) The Possible Harm to Competition from the Practice
So does this mean that the practice is net neutral in its effect on
competition? In fact, there may be just enough of a concern to tip the scales
towards condemning the practice, at least under certain circumstances.
When one takes a dynamic view of competition, the practice might have
lingering pernicious effects. It is not so much the survival of the inefficient
affiliate itself that is the problem, but the perception it creates that the
chaebol will do whatever is necessary (i.e., engage in acts that are
unprofitable regardless of the possibility of recoupment) to sustain the
failing affiliate.
Note that this is different from the “entrenchment” or “deep pocket”
theory. There, the objection was against the competitive advantage
Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 1191, 1197–98 (1977). While antitrust could conceivably play a role in alleviating the problems
of “political influence,” AYAL, at 71–72, that issue exceeds the scope of this Article.
74
Ju, supra note 38, at 653–54.
75
Elzinga, supra note 73, at 1197; Weston, supra note 60, at 73.
76
The KFTC has also cited reduced incentives to compete (slack) on part of the supported affiliate
as a possible concern of undue support. KFTC, A HISTORY, supra note 17, at 262. This seems unlikely
to harm consumers in our case since any additional inefficiency on the part of the affiliate will only
hasten its demise or increase the costs of keeping it alive. Since the affiliate is already being priced out
of the market by its more efficient rivals, it would not be able to increase prices towards consumers. One
might argue that the increased slack would further lessen the competitive pressure from the affiliate on
its rivals, but the decrease in pricing pressure may well be insignificant considering that the affiliate is
already on the verge of exiting the market.
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conferred by efficiencies resulting from the size and scale of the chaebol. A
more or equally efficient rival could still outcompete the affiliate, and even
procure funds from the financial markets if necessary to match scale and
improve its competitiveness. The running assumption was that the affiliate
might attempt to leverage the synergies it can realize as a member of the
conglomerate group, not that the affiliate or the chaebol as a whole would
engage in unprofitable activities. In our case, however, the above
perception, which would be further reinforced by the practice, could chill
the rival’s incentives to invest in efficient cost-reducing activities because
any resulting price reduction would be readily matched by the affiliate via
the support, and thereby deprive the rival of the opportunity to fully realize
the efficiency gains from the activities. In the long run, this harms
consumers as well because it results in higher prices or, put differently,
reduces the rival’s incentives to lower prices.77
This is also distinguishable from the predation theory previously
discussed, since the concern here is not that rivals will be priced out, but
that they will be less incentivized to engage in price competition
themselves. 78 Also, the predation theory presumes that the affiliate (or
chaebol group as a whole) will be able recoup its losses following the exit
of its rivals, not simply absorb them (indefinitely) as in our case.
This chilling effect is less likely to be a concern if the market in which
the affiliate participates is competitive, while being more of a concern in
oligopolistic markets or those dominated by chaebol affiliates all backed
with a guarantee of support. Thus, ideally, condemnation of the practice
would only come after an analysis of the market structure and proof of
actual or potential anticompetitive effects. However, such an analysis could
be time consuming, costly, and prone to error since the dampening of price
competition may not be readily visible. In this regard, one could
conceivably understand the court’s position as taking the view that such
chilling effects are more likely than not to occur and will be more
pernicious in markets where the chaebols are active based on the significant
economic concentration and structural issues of the nation’s economy
previously discussed. The merits of such a view can be debated, but this
provides an explanation for the courts summarily condemning the practice
without a proper analysis into its effects on competition.

77

Note that incentives for destructive innovation may still be preserved despite such chilling
effects, which would likely impact incremental innovation incentives.
78
Nor is the theory based on a fear of retaliation (including predation) from the affiliate or its other
chaebol members.
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2. Tunneling by Funneling Business to an Affiliate
(a) Funneling of Business as a Form of Tunneling
Funneling of business (il-gam-mo-rah-joo-gi) is a phenomenon that
has recently been the subject of much controversy in Korea.79 It describes a
situation where one or more of the member companies in a chaebol group
decide to direct all or a substantial portion of one or more of their business
requirements to an affiliate in the group. Efficiencies may drive such
decisions. For example, it may be nothing more than an attempt to achieve
economies of scale in the procurement of services or distribution of goods,
and thereby reduce related costs, which is entirely procompetitive.
This usually benign practice has come under fire in situations where a
business opportunity of significant scale and volume is diverted away from
competitive third parties in the market to an affiliate privately held by the
chaebol’s owner family. The price charged by the affiliate is substantially
higher than the price that would have been obtained in the market through
competitive bidding. Instead of the chaebol companies sharing in any
efficiency gains possibly achieved by pooling one or more of the chaebol
companies’ business, all or most of the efficiency gains are appropriated
away by the owner family. The privately held affiliate essentially acts as a
vehicle for extraction.80
It is possible to provide a justification for diverting the opportunity
away from the market into the hands of an affiliate. The affiliate’s
competitors may have been unwilling to undertake relationship specific
investments required by the chaebol companies, and thus the practice could
have been necessary to resolve a hold-up problem. 81 The costs of
investment required by the affiliate could also explain an initial increase in
price compared to the status quo.
This, however, does not explain why it would be more beneficial to the
funneling company and its shareholders to direct the company’s business to
a privately held affiliate controlled by the owner family, rather than
establish or transact with a subsidiary, which would enable the company to
better share in the efficiency gains. 82 There is yet again a possible
79

Lim, supra note 59, at 308–11.
The main criticism against the practice is that it serves as a tool for a generational transfer of
wealth within the chaebol’s owner family. Critics have pointed to figures that show a higher rate of
funneling of business in cases where the son or daughter of the current Chairman holds a higher portion
of equity in the affiliate to which the business is funneled. Id. at Part IV.2.(1).
81
LUIS CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 41 (2000).
82
Other justifications have been suggested for the practice, which have been reflected in the
MRFTA Enforcement Decree. Dokjeom-Gyuje Mit Gongjeong-Georae-e Gwanhan Beobryul
Shihaengryung [Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act], Presidential
Decree No. 25173, Feb. 11, 2014, apps. 1-3, 1-4 (S. Kor.). These include the need to maintain
80
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justification. If there are significant risks involved in carrying out the
business, outsourcing it to a third party may be part of a risk mitigating or
sharing measure. Only here, since non-affiliated third parties are not willing
to undertake the costly requisite investments, the owner family has decided
to do so and has benefitted the other non-controlling shareholders in the
process. This explanation, however, is belied by the fact that the diverted
business rarely seems to fit this description. Instead, the business directed to
the privately held affiliate has often been stable and lucrative, backed by an
implicit guarantee of flow of business from other member companies in the
chaebol group.83
Again, the possible agency problem between the owner family
(controlling shareholders) and the other shareholders seems fairly apparent.
The question is whether the practice also gives rise to cognizable harm to
competition.
(b) Proffered rationales for the practice’s harm to competition
At first glance, there does not seem to be anything inherently
anticompetitive about the practice itself. Indeed, even if the practice’s sole
purpose were to serve as an extraction scheme, there seems to be no
apparent reason to believe that the transfer of wealth from one company to
another (or from one shareholder to another) would automatically result in
harm to competition.84
There have, however, been attempts to explain why competition would
be harmed as a result of funneling. The concerns raised against the practice
come in two broad categories. The first concern is that the affiliate has been
able to leverage its position as a member company of the chaebol group to
gain competitive advantages. The focus of both the KFTC and the courts on
the preferential terms enjoyed by the affiliate, like higher transaction prices
or greater volume, are a reflection of this argument.85 This seems more of
confidentiality or ensure stability for critical services, etc. These would all seem like justifications for
diverting the business away from the market rather than one for directing the business to a privately held
affiliate.
83
See, e.g., KFTC, 2007Josa0485 (Decision No. 2007-504), Oct. 24, 2007 (Hyundai Glovis case)
(S. Kor.). For a more detailed description of the case, see Lim, supra note 59, at IV.1.
84
Young-Hoa Son, Gyeyeolsa Budang Jeewon Hangwee Gyuje-eui Beob-juk Jaengjum-kwa
Gaesun Bangan – Ilgammorajoogee, Budang Naeboo Georae-leul Joongshim-euro [Legal Issues and
Improvements for Regulation of Undue Support Among Affiliates: Focusing on Funneling and Undue
Intra-Transactions], 12 ECON. L. 25, 47–48 (2013) (S. Kor.).
85
KFTC, 2012Sugam2312 (Decision No. 2012-040), Mar. 21, 2012 (S. Kor.); KFTC,
2012Shigam0470 (Decision No. 2012-227), Sept. 3, 2012 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2004Du7610, Jan. 25, 2007 (S. Kor.); Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2007Nu30903, Aug. 19, 2009
(S. Kor.); see also Eun-Jung Ahn, Gongjeong-Georae Beobsang Budang Jeewon Hangwee Gyuje —
Ilgammorajoogee-leul Joongshim-euro [Regulation of Undue Support under the MRFTA: Focusing on
Funneling of Business], 11 ECON. L. 211, 220 n. 30 (2013) (S. Kor.) (listing other recent enforcement
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an objection to bigness rather than a valid concern about harm to
competition. While attaining better terms than rivals and bringing in higher
revenue through large volumes of affiliated transactions may seem patently
unfair to some, this does not automatically lead to higher prices or a
reduction in quantity in the market where the affiliate is active. We have
already reviewed the shortcomings of the entrenchment or deep pocket
theory, so there is no need to repeat what has already been discussed.
The second category of concern seems better grounded in that it
focuses on the competitive effects of the practice. The concern here is that
rivals in markets of either the funneling company or receiving affiliate may
be foreclosed from their respective markets.86 Funneling naturally closes a
portion of the market (e.g., volume corresponding to the funneled business)
from rivals, who are now faced with truncated markets that do not include
the funneling companies in the upstream market (e.g., manufacturing) and
the receiving affiliate in the downstream market (e.g., transportation).87 The
anticompetitive theory is similar to one involving tying or exclusive
dealing, which may reflect the fact that the funneling company will divert
virtually all or most of its relevant business to the affiliate. This means that
the funneling company will often be exclusively dealing with the affiliate,
or in effect tying their respective products with the affiliate’s product or
service.88 The theory is summarized in the following.
The affiliate is able to impair the efficiency of its rivals because the
exclusively funneled business represents a significant enough portion of the
market to prevent rivals from achieving minimum efficient scale. This will
dampen the incentives of the affiliate’s rivals to engage in price
competition, because any gains from lowering prices will now be smaller
due to the rivals’ inability to wrestle away the business of the funneling
firm(s). The affiliate’s rivals, deprived of their minimum efficient scale,
may in fact be forced to raise their prices to the funneling company’s
rivals. 89 And if the affiliate’s rivals are excluded from the market, the
funneling company’s rivals are now deprived of efficient alternatives to the
affiliate (to the extent that the downstream product is complementary to the
upstream product), and can be excluded from the upstream market
themselves.90
actions by the KFTC).
86
Son, supra note 84, at 29; Ahn, supra note 85, at 213.
87
The opposite case is also possible where the funneling company is in the downstream market and
the receiving affiliate in the upstream market supplies services or input to the funneling company.
88
Such exclusivity may not necessarily be memorialized in a legal binding document between the
parties, as they are under common control of the owner family of the chaebol group.
89
The opposite may also happen where price competition heats up among the rivals in an attempt to
gain the remaining business.
90
Note that the anticompetitive theory presumes that the funneling company or companies
collectively will have a monopoly or enjoy significant market power in the upstream market. If not, the
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This type of concern, however, is subject to the same challenge that
so-called leverage theories have faced in the past. The challenge comes
from the single monopoly profit theorem. Its rather simple but powerful
intuition is that a monopolist in the upstream market cannot profitably
leverage its market power into the downstream market for a complementary
good. Because consumers consider the total price paid for both the
upstream good and downstream good in making consumption decisions, an
increase in price in the downstream market will concomitantly decrease the
price in the upstream market. Hence, even if the monopolist were to
monopolize the downstream market, it cannot increase its total profits in
excess of the monopoly profits it is already reaping in the upstream
market.91 If the single monopoly profit theorem holds, the monopolist lacks
the incentive to leverage its market power into the downstream market.92 In
fact, to the extent that exclusionary conduct is costly, a leveraging strategy
might result in reduced overall profits, since such costs would have to be
deducted from the total monopoly profits. This means that even if funneling
were to occur, it would be the result of efficient behavior rather than an
anticompetitive strategy.
The single monopoly profit theorem, however, is not without
limitations. One well-known exception is when the upstream market is
contestable and not fixed as the theorem assumes. If a downstream rival of
the affiliate could enter into the upstream market and threaten the upstream
funneling company’s monopoly, the funneling monopolist may have an
incentive to monopolize the downstream market and eliminate the threat.93
The funneling monopolist may also attempt to raise entry barriers by
monopolizing or excluding competitors of the affiliate in the downstream
market because this would increase entry costs by requiring a two-market
entry on the part of potential upstream rivals.94 The single monopoly profits
theorem also assumes that the downstream product does not have
consumption value independent of the upstream product. To the extent that
the receiving affiliate has upstream customers other than the funneling
monopolist, this means that the affiliate’s product or service has
independent consumption value. Thus, the funneling monopolist can assist
the affiliate in increasing its overall profits without sacrificing the

theory fails because the affiliate’s rivals will be able to continue to compete without their efficiency
being impaired despite the funneling.
91
ROBERT A. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX: A LAW AT WAR WITH ITSELF 372–75, 380–81 (1978);
EINER ELHAUGE, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 359 (2d ed. 2011).
92
Rather, one would imagine that the upstream monopolist would prefer a competitive downstream
market since that would diminish the price of the downstream product to marginal cost and enable the
monopolist to maximize its rent in the upstream market.
93
Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory,
123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 417 (2009). The threat in this case would be entry into the upstream market.
94
Id. at 417–18.
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monopolist’s own profits, by excluding downstream competitors of the
affiliate from the market and enabling the affiliate to increase the price to
customers other than the funneling monopolist.95
(c) An Interesting Twist to the Single Monopoly Profit Theorem in
the Case of Funneling
The last scenario mentioned above regarding the single monopoly
profit theorem hints to an interesting twist in the case of funneling. Might
an upstream monopolist still choose to leverage its market power to
monopolize the downstream market even when such leveraging would
result in sacrificing its own profits, i.e., even in cases where the single
monopoly theorem holds?
The single monopoly profit theorem is predicated on the basic
assumption that the monopolist will conduct its business in a profit
maximizing manner. But in cases of funneling, the owner family
(controlling shareholders) behaves in a manner which maximizes their own
wealth rather than just the company’s profits, which is the sum of the
wealth derived from both the funneling company and the receiving affiliate.
This means that the owner family may direct the company to engage in
funneling that does not maximize the profits of the funneling company if it
results in an increase in the owner family’s total combined wealth from the
two companies. A simple example may be illustrative.
A manufactures product α, and B manufactures product β. A has a
monopoly over α, and the product market for β is competitive. We assume
that α costs 10 to produce and is sold at 15, and β costs 5 to produce and is
sold at cost. For simplicity, we assume constant costs and homogenous
products. We further assume that β is a complementary downstream product
of α, is consumed in a fixed proportion with α (1:1), and is not separately
consumed from α. Thus, the single monopoly profit theorem holds.
Since customers consume 1 unit of α together with 1 unit of β,
assuming that A is maximizing its profits by charging a monopoly price for
α, A’s current profit is 5 {(15 + 5) – (10 + 5)}. If A were to enter the
product β market, leverage its market power in the upstream market, and
succeed in monopolizing the downstream market (e.g., through a tie of both
of its products), the total combined profit it could make in the two markets
would still be 5. This is because any increase in the now monopolized price
of β would entail a concomitant drop in α’s price to lure customers who
now face a higher price for β.
The results would be the same even if firms A and B were wholly
owned by shareholder X. A exclusively supplies α to B (funneling) in an
95

Id. at 416. If, as in usual cases of tying, the downstream product were also produced by the
monopolist, it would increase its overall profits as a result of this strategy.
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attempt to exclude B’s rivals. Even if A were to succeed in assisting B to
monopolize the downstream market, X could not increase the profits
derived from A or the combined profits derived from both companies. Thus,
X does not have an incentive to direct A to assist B in monopolizing the
downstream market by funneling business to B.
Let us now assume that X holds 50% of A’s equity and 100% of B’s
equity. The wealth X derives from both companies through the sales of α
and β is 2.5 {(5 x 50%) + (0 x 100%)}. As in the above case, A assists B in
monopolizing the downstream market by funneling its business. After
monopolizing the downstream market, B now increases its price by 5 to 10,
while A decreases its price by 5 to also 10. While the combined profits of A
and B remains 5 {(10 – 10) + (10 – 5)}, X’s wealth increases twofold to 5
{(0 x 50%) + (5 x 100%)}. Thus, X has an incentive to direct A to funnel
business to B and thereby exclude B’s rivals as long as its equity ownership
in B is higher than in A. 96 This is true even in cases where the single
monopoly profit theorem holds and the combined profits of both companies
cannot be increased. In other words, X will direct A to engage in
anticompetitive conduct (exclusion) since it allows X to extract more
wealth (monopoly profits) from B.
Some may point out that the total price consumers face has not
increased and remains at 20, and therefore argue that consumer welfare will
not be harmed. That may or may not be the case depending on the long run
balance of the benefits and costs of a monopoly in the product β market.
The point here is that when the owner family’s (controlling shareholder’s)
degree of control (i.e., ability to extract wealth from the company) differs
between companies they control; the owner family may have the incentive
to engage in funneling that is anticompetitive even when the single
monopoly profit theorem holds. The incentive to engage in such
anticompetitive funneling generally increases the lower the owner family’s
equity in the funneling company or the higher the owner-controlling
shareholder’s equity in the receiving affiliate.97

96
See also Seo, supra note 36, at 169 (arguing that the controlling shareholder’s incentive to
engage in tunneling increases as the mismatch between the controlling shareholder’s share of equity in
the tunneling company (A in the above example) and his or her control over the company grows (i.e.,
the controlling shareholder’s equity share decreases)).
97
One might question whether X would be capable of actually implementing the above funneling
scheme over the objections of the non-controlling shareholders of A. According to the example above,
corporate profits are shifted from A to B to the detriment of A’s non-controlling shareholders. As such,
one would expect the shareholders to object to any attempt by X (or A’s controllers) to implement such
a funneling scheme. Information regarding tunneling activities may not become readily available or
recognizable to shareholders even under current disclosure rules, and in certain cases could be
implemented over the objections of minority shareholders.

292

36_2_1_LIMMIN

FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/16/2016 3:59 PM

Competition and Corporate Governance
36:267 (2016)

3. The Copperweld Objection
The discussion so far shows that tunneling, which raises problems for
corporate governance policy, can—under certain circumstances—harm
competition as well. However, there remains an objection to be addressed,
which argues against competition law’s interjection into corporate
governance issues. We will call it the Copperweld objection, because its
arguments follow the decision of that case.
As briefly discussed above, Copperweld and the court decisions that
followed essentially state that companies under common control (e.g., a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary) cannot conspire with one another
for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.98 The underpinning logic of
the court’s decision that the Copperweld objection musters is that such
affiliated transactions should be treated like intra-firm dealings between
different business units within a single corporation. This is because the
companies ultimately act under the direction of a single economic and
business mind and thus comprise a single business entity for purposes of
antitrust law. Since antitrust does not take issue with intra-firm dealings, it
should not be concerned with dealings between affiliates under common
control that are no different in reality.99
Korean competition law also provides for a similar exception in the
case of cartels under the “de facto single business entity” theory. 100 The
Undue Support Clause, however, specifically targets affiliated transactions
and thus contradicts Copperweld where tunneling is involved. Indeed, the
Korean Supreme Court has ruled that the clause even applies to transactions
between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary.101
In sum, according to the Copperweld objection, the Undue Support
Clause is a legislative error because affiliated transactions are not the
concern of competition law or policy. Because the Copperweld objection is
predicated on the argument that transactions between companies under
common control are no different from intra-firm dealings between different
business units, it is important to understand why intra-firm dealings are not
subject to the scrutiny of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Copperweld is not a
repudiation of the fact that intra-firm or affiliated dealings can and do result
in harm to competition. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the
98

See supra notes 44–45.
Ok-Rial Song, Gieob Jibdan Budang Naeboo Georae Gyuje-eui Beobjeongchaek-jeok Ihae
[Regulation of Intra-Group Transactions: An Economic Analysis], 46 SEOUL L.J. 227, 235 (2005) (S.
Kor.). See also Ju, supra note 38, at 657 (criticizing the courts’ condemnation of transactions between a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary for undue support as nonsensical).
100
KFTC, GUIDELINES FOR CONCERTED PRACTICE REVIEW 2 (2009), http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/static/
Legal_Authority/Guidelines%20for%20concerted%20practice%20Review_mar%2014%202012.pdf (S.
Kor.).
101
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 04Du1483, Dec. 22, 2006 (S. Kor.)
99
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judgment would create a “gap” between Section 1 and Section 2, whereby
anticompetitive conduct might not be reachable under the Sherman Act.102
Rather, the point was that it is impractical to expect intra-firm business
units to act with independent and separate interests from one another for
antitrust policy purposes.103 Business units within a corporation all act with
a unity of purpose. They do not and should not be expected to compete with
one another or diverge in their incentives for maximizing the total profit of
the corporation.104 Accordingly, even if the business units were to agree to
restrain competition, such an agreement, in and of itself, would not result in
a cognizable loss of competition that would have otherwise existed from an
antitrust perspective. If, however, the intra-firm dealings are part of a
monopolization scheme, it can be prosecuted under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. For example, illegal tying can occur whether the tied
products are manufactured by a single company, a company and its affiliate,
or a company and a third party. The Copperweld objection misconstrues the
judgment’s logic when arguing that affiliated transactions have nothing to
do with competition law and policy. In the prior analysis of the two types of
tunneling activities, the possible anticompetitive effects are not predicated
on some loss of competition or divergence of interests that would have
existed had the transaction not taken place. The fact that the tunneling
activity could well be characterized as monopolization under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act also evidences this point.
The Copperweld objection could instead be construed as an argument
that competition is likely to be harmed only if and when the tunneling
company or receiving affiliate acts upon the increase in market power
resulting from the tunneling. 105 Thus, competition policy should concern
itself with the subsequent anticompetitive conduct rather than waste
resources in going after the tunneling practice itself. This point is worth
considering, because one can imagine cases where the tunneling would
likely not have a substantial impact on competition, e.g., where the amount
of wealth extracted was insignificant. This, however, is more of an
argument on enforcement priorities rather than an argument that tunneling
has nothing to do with competition. Also, in the case of the tunneling
activities analyzed above, the chilling effects on price competition are
triggered by the behavior itself rather than some separate and subsequent
102

467 U.S. 752, 774–76 (1984).
ELHAUGE, supra note 91, at 513.
104
Another reason for excluding inter-firm dealings from antitrust scrutiny is that the administrative
costs of discerning whether an agreement exists and whether it is anticompetitive would be significantly
higher than cases that involve dealings with entities outside of the firm. For example, such inter-firm
dealings may lack the documentation and evidence usually found in the case of external dealings. This
reason, however, seems less relevant in our case because tunneling usually involves transactions with a
separate entity outside of the company even if it is with an affiliate.
105
Song, supra note 99, at 237.
103
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conduct. The anticompetitive monopolization of the affiliate’s relevant
market via funneling is also the result of the funneling activity itself, and
not the result of some separate conduct. The point here is not that tunneling
always impairs competition, but that it can do so.
A cautionary note is warranted. In the case of funneling, an
anticompetitive theory that the funneling firm attempted to monopolize the
affiliate’s market based on a wealth extraction strategy for the owner family
would fail if the affiliate was a wholly owned subsidiary of the funneling
company as shown through the previous analysis. But this is not so because
of Copperweld’s logic or the funneling company’s control over the affiliate,
but because the wealth extraction theory would not work (i.e., the funneling
is unlikely to result in an increase of the owner family’s wealth), implying
that there must have been some other, and possibly efficient, motivation for
the activity.
* * *
We have now confirmed that tunneling can have adverse consequences
for both corporate governance and competition, and that both policies may
have legitimate concerns over such activities. It then seems hasty to
conclude that competition policy and corporate governance have nothing to
do with one another and should simply go on their separate ways. In the
following, we further look at the implications from Korea’s experience with
the Undue Support Clause for regulating tunneling.
IV. LEARNING FROM THE UNDUE SUPPORT CLAUSE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION OF TUNNELING
Related party transactions, such as tunneling, bring to the forefront the
issue of conflicts of interest, which is a core concern of corporate
governance policy. In most countries, the existing law focuses on
permitting beneficial related party transactions while prohibiting harmful
ones (e.g., tunneling) rather than imposing an absolute ban on all related
party transactions. In the U.S., for instance, securities regulations and
corporate law are the primary regulators of related party transactions; the
former primarily harnesses disclosure requirements, and the latter largely
provides for ex-post remedies for conflict of interest transactions.106 Both
aim for an effective distinction between beneficial related party transactions
and tunneling in order to protect shareholders’ interests. As discussed
above, however, tunneling activities that involve companies with market
power can also harm competition and raise concerns under competition law
and policy. Table 1 below formalizes the four possible scenarios regarding
related party transactions.
106

See generally Geeyoung Min, The SEC and the Courts’ Cooperative Policing of Related Party
Transactions, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 663 (2014).
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TABLE 1: RELATED PARTY TRANSACTION SCENARIOS
Benefits Competition
(or at least does not harm it)

Harms
Competition

Benefits
Shareholders

—

Triggers Competition Law

Harms
Shareholders

Triggers Corporate
Governance Law

Triggers Corporate Governance
Law and Competition Law

When a transaction is beneficial to shareholders and does not harm
competition, neither corporate governance nor competition laws will forbid
the transaction. When a transaction harms shareholders, but not
competition, it comes under the scrutiny of corporate law. By contrast,
when a transaction harms competition while benefitting shareholders at the
same time, the transaction would be subject to scrutiny under competition
law. The focus of our Article is on the last scenario where a related party
transaction harms both shareholders and competition. In theory, both
competition law and corporate governance laws could be invoked, but the
legal response to tunneling has been different across countries. While U.S.
antitrust law stands ready to prosecute competitive harms caused by
tunneling, for various reasons it takes a relatively backseat role compared to
corporate governance laws which focus on the adverse impact of tunneling
on (minority or non-controlling) shareholders. On the other hand, as
mentioned above, in Korea competition law has often provided the primary
regulatory response to tunneling. This contrast to the approach in the United
States and elsewhere provides a valuable opportunity to take a closer look
at how competition law can play a meaningful role in regulating tunneling
and its implications for both antitrust and corporate governance policy.107
A. Implications for Antitrust Law
As noted earlier, the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine espoused
under Copperweld impedes the prosecution of tunneling activities under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act in U.S. antitrust law. While tunneling
107

There are of course major distinctions between the two countries with respect to prevalent
corporate ownership structures and the corporate laws that govern them. In Korea, the small coterie of
chaebols exert significant influence in the market and the general economy. On the other hand, the U.S.
economy has evolved through a high dependency on equity financing and dispersed ownership
structures, leading to a more shareholder-centric focus for its corporate laws. This has led to an emphasis
on the protection of retail investors, with shareholder wealth maximization being generally accepted as
the primary goal of corporate governance law. The difference, however, significantly decreases when it
comes to publicly traded companies with controlling shareholders.
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activities in the form of unilateral action by monopolies can be punished
under Section 2 of the Act, this would not be the case for tunneling
activities undertaken at companies that do not qualify as monopolists but
nevertheless wield significant market power. In applying the Copperweld
analysis to specific cases, U.S. courts have traditionally focused on whether
the parties are under common control by primarily relying on equity
ratios.108 In Part III.B.2 we saw, however, that even in cases where parties
of the transaction are under common control, differences in equity holding
ratios may provide incentives for anticompetitive agreements between the
parties. Accordingly, this warrants a careful reconsideration of the singular
focus on the existence of control under the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine, and raises the question of whether the degree of control (as
reflected in the equity ratios) should also be a factor in deciding whether to
extend Copperweld to particular cases, at least where there are allegations
of anticompetitive tunneling.
Our analysis of the anticompetitive potential of tunneling activities
also highlights the role of intent in assessing whether a particular conduct is
exclusionary under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Courts nowadays tend to
agree that a general willingness to decimate one’s competition is
insufficient to find a particular conduct exclusionary. 109 Intent, however,
can be useful in understanding the likely effects of the disputed conduct, 110
particularly if the conduct has the potential to be both anticompetitive and
procompetitive. Funneling, for example, will often take the form of
exclusive or near-exclusive dealing between the related parties, and such
dealings are not anticompetitive by nature. The point is that when the intent
behind the particular transaction between the related parties is to extract
private benefits for the controllers of the firm (i.e., tunneling), this should
raise a red flag for a closer look at the possible, and in some cases likely,
anticompetitive effects of the conduct.
B. Implications for Corporate Governance Law
We now turn to the potential implications of Korea’s unique regulation
of tunneling activities for corporate law. Traditionally under the U.S. state
corporate laws, the main remedy for tunneling is a shareholder derivative
action based on the breach of a controller’s fiduciary duty of loyalty. In
addition to the directors’ fiduciary duty to shareholders, U.S. corporate law
has long recognized the controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty to the

108

ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 52, at 33.
Id. at 244.
110
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that intent would be
“relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of the monopolist’s conduct.”).
109
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company and to minority shareholders.111 In a derivative suit by minority
shareholders, the critical issue is whether the conflict of interest transaction
can be deemed “fair.” When a controlling shareholder stands on both sides
of a transaction, courts generally apply the most stringent standard of
review, and the controlling shareholder as an interested party (i.e.,
defendant) bears the burden of proof of showing that the transaction was
fair. 112 Fairness, in this context, consists of two elements: whether the
transaction at issue went through a fair decision-making process (fair
dealing) and whether the price paid (or the terms of the transaction) was fair
(fair price).113
Although the courts in Delaware have emphasized that these two
prongs of the entire fairness standard—fair dealing as procedural fairness
and fair price as substantive fairness—are separate concepts, the courts
have also emphasized that “the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as
between fair dealing and fair price” and that “all aspects of the issue must
be examined as a whole” to determine the entire fairness of conflict of
interest transactions, of which tunneling would be a prime example. 114
While verifying the “fair dealing” prong, i.e., whether a transaction satisfies
the procedural requirements, has been fairly straightforward, evaluating the
fair price of the challenged transaction has been more difficult, partly due to
the lack of a uniform standard for determining whether the transaction’s
price was fair. This has led to an emphasis on fair dealing when applying
the entire fairness test; when a transaction at issue satisfies screening
procedures by disinterested and independent directors or minority
shareholders, courts have shown a tendency to uphold the transaction based
on the underlying assumption that fair dealing generally leads to a fair

111
Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A 2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994); Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109–10 (Del. 1952).
112
The Delaware supreme court has held in the context of parent-subsidiary mergers:
[w]hen directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of
the bargain. The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands
on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient
to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted).
113
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former
embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured,
negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial
considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value,
earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of
a company’s stock . . . . Here, we address the two basic aspects of fairness separately because
we find reversible error as to both.
Id. at 11.
114
Id.
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price. 115 As a consequence, controllers have focused on setting up the
necessary procedural protections, including approval by independent
directors or minority shareholders, when executing a conflict of interest
transaction.
However, the court’s treatment of tunneling by controlling
shareholders has begun to evolve. In the Southern Peru Copper case,116 the
Delaware Chancery Court looked beyond the nominal independence of a
special committee in evaluating procedural fairness and inquired into
whether the special committee was “well functioning,” free from the
influence or pressure of the controlling shareholder.117 For this purpose, the
Chancellor considered “the substantive decisions of the special committee,
a fact intensive exercise that overlaps with the examination of fairness
itself.”118 That the Chancellor was willing to further look into the substance
of the transaction suggests that, going forward, the examination of whether
the transaction’s “price” was fair may become more important in applying
the entire fairness test.
In this regard, Korea’s unique application of competition law to
tunneling transactions raises an interesting possibility of considering the
competitive state of the relevant markets in answering whether a conflict of
interest transaction satisfies the entire fairness test. Let us suppose a
situation where two companies, each facing a competitive market
environment, transact. In this case, regardless of whether the companies are
under common control, the fact that they face strong competition in their
own respective markets can indicate that the transaction between them
would have been executed on “competitive” or “fair” terms. If not, the
company that receives the bad end of the deal would suffer, and its
prospects of survival in the competitive market environment would
diminish in the long run. 119 For a court confronted with the task of
determining whether a conflict of interest transaction has been executed on
fair terms, the fact that both companies face sufficient competitive pressure
115
See Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51A.3d 1213, 1244 (Del. 2012); Auriga Capital Corp. v.
Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 857 (Del. Ch. 2012) (noting that the court properly considered how
interested party dealt with minority shareholders (fair dealing) in determining the fair price because “the
extent to which the process leading to the self-dealing either replicated or deviated from the behavior
one would expect in an arms-length deal bears importantly on the price determination.”).
116
In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 789 (Del. Ch. 2011), aff’d
sub nom. Americas Mining Corp. V. Theriault, 51 A. 3d 1213 (Del. 2012).
117
Id. at 789.
118
The court recognized the possibility of a controller pressuring the approving entity (independent
directors or disinterested shareholders), and substantively analyzed the situation in determining whether
there had been “fair dealing.” Id. at 788 n.79 (“Facing the proverbial 800 pound gorilla who wants the
rest of the bananas all for himself, chimpanzees like independent and disinterested stockholders could
not be expected to make sure that the gorilla paid a fair price.”)
119
This would also make the controllers worse-off, making it less likely that they would engage in
such activities.
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in their respective markets could serve as indirect proof that the challenged
transaction satisfies the entire fairness test.
Conversely, when at least one of the companies enjoys significant
market power in its market, the common controller(s) could, under certain
circumstances, privately benefit by leveraging that company’s market
power to enhance the other company’s competitive position, resulting in a
higher likelihood of non-competitive or unfair terms. For example, if
company X is shown to have attempted to monopolize the market in which
Y operates by leveraging its market power, and if X and Y are under
common control by a common controller but under differing degrees of
control, such circumstances could imply that there was a deliberate shift of
possible gains or profits from X to Y to the detriment of the minority
shareholders of X. These two aspects—market power and disparate degrees
of control (ownership)—could be useful for the plaintiff-shareholders to
show that the defendant-controller has sufficient incentive and has engaged
in tunneling.120
One might still question why corporate law should consider the
competitive impact of tunneling on consumers. If a particular conduct
harms competition and can be scrutinized under antitrust law, this raises the
question whether additional intervention by corporate governance law
might be unnecessary or redundant. Private antitrust litigation can only be
raised by those that suffer antitrust injury and thus has limitations in terms
of standing. 121 Antitrust enforcement by agencies is also constrained by
limitations in resources, and is unlikely to cover the broad swath of
tunneling activities undertaken throughout the corporate community. A
corporation’s shareholders are likely those that have the strongest incentive
in investing the time and resources to monitor tunneling activities. While
shareholders may also suffer from short-termism, thus hobbling their
incentives to discern and target tunneling activities that harm long-term
120

Even in the absence of any unfairness in the short-term, when one of the parties to a conflict-ofinterest transaction wields significant market power, such transactions can lead to a long-term
destruction of shareholder value. Suppose X, a retail company, enters into an exclusive sourcing contract
with Y for product A. Y is an affiliate of X under common control. X is a monopolist or wields
significant market power in the relevant retail market. Even when the sourcing contract contains fair
(market-value based) terms, if the exclusive contract results in the diminishing of competition in the
market for product A in the long-run or eventually forecloses Y’s rivals, once the competition has been
eliminated or substantially reduced, Y will have a much lower incentive to innovate and supply X with a
better quality product at a lower price in the long-term. In other words, in the short term, the exclusive
contract might be neutral or even beneficial for X’s shareholders, but in the long run it may harm X’s
shareholders by forgoing additional efficiencies that would have resulted from robust competition in the
market for product A. It would probably be too speculative for a court to consider such long-term
consequences at the time X’s shareholders challenged the fairness of the exclusive sourcing contract.
The example, however, shows how anticompetitive conduct could harm not only consumers but
shareholders as well.
121
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990).
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shareholder value, this should not provide reason for limiting corporate
governance’s focus to only short-term shareholder value considerations.
Thus, it seems more desirable than not to incorporate the competitive
impact of the related party transaction when undertaking a fairness
analysis.122
V. CONCLUSION
The Undue Support Clause is a unique feature of Korean law in that it
utilizes competition law as a tool to regulate conduct that has traditionally
been the concern of corporate governance law and policy. Criticism that a
corporate governance problem has nothing to do with competition or vice
versa does not seem well founded when examined in the context of
tunneling conduct targeted by the Undue Support Clause. At the same time,
there has been some confusion about when and how tunneling can cause
harm to competition, and much of the rationales proffered in the past seems
to have their roots in an antiquated and discounted theory of harm caused
by the conglomerate form. This Article has attempted to clear away some of
the confusing and erroneous rhetoric that has cluttered the path to exploring
the role competition law can play in corporate governance policy. This is
certainly not a complete survey of all the intricacies and issues that can
arise when competition and corporate governance intersect with one
another. Nevertheless, the history of the Undue Support Clause’s
enforcement provides an invaluable opportunity to explore the topic
because it provides a rare real world example.
As Korea’s competition law continues its journey into the realm of
corporate governance, there will be more opportunities to reevaluate the
relationship between competition and corporate governance. For now, the
Undue Support Clause has managed to prove that competition law is not
irrelevant to corporate governance and can indeed play a role in soothing
some of its chronic ailments.

122

We do not argue that an analysis of market competitiveness or possible anticompetitive harm
should always be taken into account in breach of duty of loyalty litigation under corporate law. Rather,
we suggest that, for certain cases as we described above, an analysis of market competition or
anticompetitive harm could serve as a useful indicator for the fairness of the transactions.
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